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1 Introduction
One possibility to study the process of coalition formation is to model it as
a hedonic coalition formation game (cf. Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogo-
molnaia and Jackson (2002)). In such a model each players preferences over
coalitions depend solely on the composition of members of her coalition (cf.
Drèze and Greenberg (1980)). Given a hedonic game, the main interest is
then in the existence of outcomes (partitions of the set of players) that are
stable in some sense. For example, the focus in the work of Banerjee et al.
(2001) is on the existence of core stable partitions, while Bogomolnaia and
Jackson (2002) present su¢ cient conditions for the existence of Nash and
individually stable partitions.
Top responsiveness is introduced by Alcalde and Revilla (2004) as a con-
dition on playerspreferences, which captures the idea of how each player be-
lieves that others could complement her in the formation of research teams.
As shown by these authors, top responsiveness is a su¢ cient condition for
the existence of core stable partitions in hedonic games. This result is pro-
vided constructively, i.e., an algorithm, called the top covering algorithm, is
proposed for generating a core stable partition. As argued by Alcalde and Re-
villa (2004), top responsiveness induces a rich domain on playerspreferences
and economic agents behavior seems to be consistent with this property.
Therefore it is interesting to study, on the induced preference domain, the
existence of partitions that are stable also with respect to other stability
notions like strict core stability, Nash stability, and individual stability.
In doing so, we strengthen the results of Alcalde and Revilla (2004) in
two ways. First, we show the existence of strict core stable partitions, and
hence, the existence of individually stable partitions is implied. Second, we
2
consider an example to illustrate that a Nash stable partition may fail to exist,
and prove that imposing a mutuality condition turns out to be su¢ cient for
the existence of Nash stable partitions. Indeed, we show that the partition
generated by a simplied version of the top covering algorithm is strict core
stable and when the mutuality condition is imposed the partition is Nash
stable as well, where the simplied version of the top covering algorithm
always returns the same outcome as the top covering algorithm. Since the
top covering algorithm is shown by Alcalde and Revilla (2004) to be strategy-
proof on the induced preference domain, the results in this paper can be seen
as completing the study of hedonic games under top responsiveness with
respect to stability and manipulability issues.
2 Basic setup
2.1 Hedonic games
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a nite set of players. Each nonempty subset of
N is called a coalition. Each player i is endowed with preferences i over
the set Ai = fX  N j i 2 Xg of all possible coalitions she may belong
to, i.e., each i is a complete pre-ordering over Ai. A hedonic game is
described by a pair hN;i, where  is a prole of playerspreferences, i.e.,
= (1;2; : : : ;n). An outcome  for hN;i is a partition of the player
set N , i.e.,  is a collection of nonempty pairwise disjoint coalitions whose
union is N . For each partition  of N and for each player i 2 N , we denote
by (i) the coalition in  containing i.
Given a hedonic game hN;i and a partition  of N , we say that1
1 Notice that these stability notions are dened in a positiveway that will be very
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  is core stable if, for each nonempty X  N ,
(i) i X for some i 2 X;
  is strictly core stable if, for each nonempty X  N ,
(i) i X for each i 2 X if X i (i) for each i 2 X;
  is Nash stable if, for each X 2  [ f;g and for each i 2 N ,
(i) i X [ fig;
  is individually stable if, for each X 2  [ f;g and for each i 2 N ,
X j X [ fig for some j 2 X if X [ fig i (i).
Observe that strict core stability implies core stability, and that Nash
stability implies individual stability. Moreover, it can easily be veried that
strict core stability implies individual stability as well.
2.2 Choice sets and top responsiveness
Let i 2 N andX 2 Ai. We denote by Ch(i;X)  2X\Ai the set of maximals
of i on X under i, i.e.,
Ch(i;X) = fY 2 2X \ Ai j Y i Z for each Z 2 2X \ Aig:
Observe that each Y 2 Ch(i;X) satises i 2 Y  X. Moreover, for each
Y; Z  2X \ Ai, we have Y i Z if Y 2 Ch(i;X) and Z 62 Ch(i;X).
As in the work of Alcalde and Revilla (2004), we assume that players
preferences satisfy top responsiveness, i.e., we assume that, for each i 2 N
the following three conditions are satised:
useful when providing our existence proofs in the next section.
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Condition 1: For each X 2 Ai, jCh(i;X)j = 1.
By ch(i;X) we denote the unique maximal set of player i on X under i,
i.e., Ch(i;X) = fch(i;X)g. Then,
Condition 2: For each pair X; Y 2 Ai, X i Y if ch(i;X) i ch(i; Y );
Condition 3: For each pair X;Y 2 Ai, X i Y if ch(i;X) i ch(i; Y ) and
X  Y .
Suppose Condition 1 is fullled, and suppose ch(i;X) i ch(i; Y ) and
X  Y . Then, we have ch(i;X) 2 Ch(i; Y ). From Condition 1, we have
Ch(i; Y ) = fch(i; Y )g, and thus, ch(i;X) = ch(i; Y ). Hence, Condition 3
can be reformulated as follows.
 for each pair X; Y 2 Ai, X i Y if ch(i;X) = ch(i; Y ) and X  Y .
2.3 The simplied top covering algorithm
In order to show that top responsiveness is a su¢ cient condition for the
existence of a core stable partition, Alcalde and Revilla (2004) propose an
algorithm, called the top covering algorithm, which can be seen as a gener-
alization of Gales top trading cycle (see Shapley and Scarf (1974) for more
details). In the following, a simplied version of this algorithm is described.
Let t be a positive integer. We dene a function Ct : N  2N ! 2N as
follows. For each i 2 N and for each X 2 Ai,
 C1(i;X) = ch(i;X), and
 Ct+1(i;X) = Sj2Ct(i;X) ch(j;X) for each positive integer t.
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Let i 2 N and X 2 Ai. Observe that j 2 ch(j;X)  X if j 2 X
(i.e., X 2 Aj), and thus, i 2 C1(i;X)  X. Let t be a positive integer,
and suppose Ct(i;X)  X. Then, j 2 ch(j;X)  X for each j 2 Ct(i;X),
and by denition, Ct(i;X)  Ct+1(i;X)  X. It follows that CjN j+1(i;X) =
CjN j(i;X). By CC(i;X) we denote CjN j(i;X). Then, we have
i 2 ch(i;X)  CC(i;X)  X for each i 2 X: (1)
Moreover, from CjN j+1(i;X) = CjN j(i;X) = CC(i;X), one can easily show by
induction on t that Ct(j;X)  CC(i;X) for each j 2 CC(i;X) and for each
positive integer t. It follows that
CC(j;X)  CC(i;X) for each j 2 CC(i;X): (2)
Now we are ready to describe the simplied top covering algorithm.
Simplied top covering algorithm:
Given: A hedonic game hN;i satisfying top responsiveness.
Step 1: Set R1 := N and  := ;.
Step 2: For k := 1 to jN j:
Step 2.1: Select an i 2 Rk satisfying jCC(i; Rk)j  jCC(j; Rk)j for each
j 2 Rk.
Step 2.2: Set Sk := CC(i; Rk),  :=  [ fSkg, and Rk+1 := Rk n Sk.
Step 2.3: If Rk+1 = ;, then goto Step 3.
Step 3: Return  as outcome.
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We denote by TChN;i the outcome obtained by applying the simplied top
covering algorithm to hN;i.
Lemma 1 Let hN;i be a hedonic game satisfying top responsiveness. When
applied to hN;i, the simplied top covering algorithm ends in nite steps
and its outcome TChN;i is a partition of N .
Proof. It is obvious that the simplied top covering algorithm ends in nite
steps, because Step 2 repeats at most jN j times.
To show that TChN;i is a partition of N , suppose Step 2 repeats 1  K 
jN j times. Then, we have TChN;i = fS1; S2; : : : ; SKg and S1 [ S2 [    [
SK [ RK+1 = N . From Step 2.2, the coalitions S1; S2; : : : ; SK ; RK+1 are
pairwise disjoint, and moreover from (1), the coalitions S1; S2; : : : ; SK are all
nonempty. Hence, TChN;i is a partition of N if R
K+1 = ;.
Indeed, when K < jN j, we have RK+1 = ; from Step 2.3. When K =
jN j, we have jS1 [ S2 [    [ SK j  K = jN j from the disjointedness and
nonemptiness of Sks, which implies RK+1 = ;.
In order to analyze the partition TChN;i, for each i 2 N , we denote by k(i)
the number such that i 2 Sk(i). In other words, the coalition TChN;i(i) = Sk(i)
is included into TChN;i at the k(i)th iteration of Step 2. Since 
TC
hN;i is a par-
tition of N , the number k(i) is well-dened for each i 2 N .
Lemma 2 Let hN;i be a hedonic game satisfying top responsiveness. Then,
for each i 2 N , TChN;i(i) = CC(i; Rk(i)).
Proof. Let i 2 N , and let j 2 Rk(i) be the player selected at the k(i)th
iteration of Step 2.1. Then, we have k(j) = k(i) and i 2 TChN;i(i) =
CC(j; Rk(j)) = CC(j; Rk(i)), and thus, from Step 2.1 we have jCC(j; Rk(i))j 
jCC(i; Rk(i))j. On the other hand, we have CC(i; Rk(i))  CC(j; Rk(i)) from
i 2 CC(j; Rk(i)) and (2). Therefore, we have CC(i; Rk(i)) = CC(j; Rk(i)), which
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implies TChN;i(i) = CC(i; Rk(i)).
From Lemma 2 and (1), we have
ch(i; Rk(i))  TChN;i(i) for each i 2 N: (3)
3 Results
3.1 Strict core stability
For a hedonic game hN;i satisfying top responsiveness, our rst result
relates a partition obtained by the simplied top covering algorithm with
the set of strictly core stable partitions of the player set N . Since strict core
stability implies individual stability, it follows by Theorem 1 stated below
that the simplied top covering algorithm generates an individually stable
partition as well.
Theorem 1 Let hN;i be a hedonic game satisfying top responsiveness.
Then, TChN;i is strictly core stable for hN;i.
Proof. Suppose there exists a nonempty X  N such that X i TChN;i(i)
for each i 2 X, and we show that TChN;i(i) i X for each i 2 X.
In doing so, we will apply Condition 3 based on the fact that for j 2 X
with k(j)  k(i) for each i 2 X the following three statements hold:
X j TChN;i(j); ()
ch(j;X) = ch(j;TChN;i(j)); ()
TChN;i(j)  X: ()
We have to show () and () since () is given by supposition.
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To show (), notice that from k(j)  k(i) for each i 2 X it follows
that X  Rk(j). Hence, from (3), we have ch(j; Rk(j))  TChN;i(j) =
CC(j; Rk(j))  Rk(j), which implies ch(j;TChN;i(j)) = ch(j; Rk(j)). By () and
Condition 2 we have ch(j;X) j ch(j;TChN;i(j)). Hence, from X  Rk(j),
we have
ch(j;X) = ch(j;TChN;i(j)) = ch
 
j; Rk(j)

; (4)
i.e., () holds true.
We turn now to showing (). Since, by Lemma 2, TChN;i(j) = CC(j; Rk(j)),
we can show () by showing that Ct(j; Rk(j))  X for each positive integer t.
Let t = 1. Then, from (4), we have
C1(j; Rk(j)) = ch(j; Rk(j)) = ch(j;X)  X:
Suppose Ct(j; Rk(j))  X for some positive integer t. Observe thatTChN;i(i) =
TChN;i(j) = CC(j; Rk(j)) for each i 2 Ct(j; Rk(j)). From (1) and (2), ch(i; Rk(j)) 
CC(i; Rk(j))  CC(j; Rk(j)) = TChN;i(i) for each i 2 Ct(j; Rk(j)), and thus,
ch(i;TChN;i(i)) = ch(i; R
k(j)). Again, by assumption, for each i 2 Ct(j; Rk(j)),
we have X i TChN;i(i), and we have ch(i;X) i ch(i;TChN;i(i)) from Con-
dition 2. Hence, from X  Rk(j), we have ch(i;X) = ch(i;TChN;i(i)) =
ch(i; Rk(j)). It follows that ch(i; Rk(j))  X for each i 2 Ct(j; Rk(j)), and
moreover,
Ct+1(j; Rk(j)) =
[
i2Ct(j;Rk(j))
ch(i; Rk(j))  X:
Therefore, Ct(j; Rk(j))  X for each positive integer t, and thus,
TChN;i(j) = CC(j; Rk(j))  X;
i.e., () holds true.
Finally, notice that from (), (), and () we have X = TChN;i(j) by
Condition 3. Therefore, TChN;i(i) = 
TC
hN;i(j) i X for each i 2 X.
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3.2 Nash stability
Nash stability is a stronger stability notion than individual stability since
in its denition there are no requirements on a positive reaction of the wel-
coming coalition. Unfortunately, top responsiveness does not guarantee the
existence of a Nash stable partition as exemplied next.
Example 1 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and playerspreferences be as follows:
f1g 1 f1; 2g 1 f1; 3g 1 f1; 2; 3g;
f2g 2 f1; 2g 2 f2; 3g 2 f1; 2; 3g;
f1; 2; 3g 3 f1; 3g 3 f2; 3g 3 f3g :
The reader can easily check that this game satises top responsiveness. Notice
that any partition in which player 1 and player 2 are not single will be blocked
by the corresponding player. Hence, we have to check only the partition
 = ff1g; f2g; f3gg. However, f1; 3g 3 f3g (and f2; 3g 3 f3g), i.e. a
Nash stable partition does not exist for this game.
In order to guarantee the existence of a Nash stable partition for a hedonic
game hN;i we will require, in addition to top responsiveness, hN;i to
satisfy mutuality, i.e., the following condition:
 For each i; j 2 N and for each X 2 Ai \Aj, i 2 ch(j;X) if and only if
j 2 ch(i;X).
In other words, mutuality requires that, for any group X of players, the
members of every players maximal on X mutually complement each other.
In the formulation of this condition we were inspired by the existence result in
the seminal paper of Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002). These authors show
that the combination of additive separability and symmetry (a stronger ver-
sion of mutuality) guarantees the existence of Nash stable partitions. Here,
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we show that, by imposing both top responsiveness and mutuality, the sim-
plied top covering algorithm generates a Nash stable partition. Note that
one can easily construct a hedonic game in which playerspreferences satisfy
top responsiveness but are not additive separable.
Theorem 2 Let hN;i be a hedonic game satisfying top responsiveness and
mutuality. Then, TChN;i is Nash stable for hN;i.
Proof. Suppose TChN;i is not Nash stable for hN;i, i.e., there exist X 2
TChN;i[f;g and i 2 N such that X[fig i TChN;i(i). Since TChN;i is strictly
core stable (by Theorem 1), we have
TChN;i(i) i fig;
which implies X 6= ;. From X [ fig i TChN;i(i), we have X 6= TChN;i(i),
which implies X \ TChN;i(i) = ; and thus i 62 X.
Observe that X 6 Rk(i). Suppose otherwise, i.e., X  Rk(i). From
X [ fig i TChN;i(i) and ch(i; Rk(i))  CC(i; Rk(i)) = TChN;i(i), we have
ch(i;X[fig) = ch(i; Rk(i)). Since X\TChN;i(i) = ;, we have ch(i;X[fig) =
fig, and from Condition 3 and X 6= ;, we have TChN;i(i) i fig i X [ fig,
which contradicts to our supposition.
Let k be a positive integer such that Sk = X. Then, we have X  Rk
and k(j) = k for each j 2 X, and from Lemma 2, CC(j; Rk) = X for each
j 2 X. Moreover, from (1), we have ch(j; Rk)  CC(j; Rk) = X for each
j 2 X, and from i 62 X, we have i 62 ch(j; Rk) for each j 2 X. From
X 6 Rk(i), we have k < k(i), which implies i 2 Rk(i)  Rk. Then, we have
ch(j; Rk) = ch(j;X [ fig) = ch(j;X), and thus,
i 62 ch(j;X [ fig) for each j 2 X:
By mutuality, we have j 62 ch(i;X [ fig) for each j 2 X, which im-
plies ch(i;X [ fig) = fig. Again, from Condition 3 and X 6= ;, we have
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TChN;i(i) i fig i X [ fig, which contradicts again to our supposition.
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